Lawyer (n): one skilled in circumventing the law" -- Ambrose Bierce

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

THE PROBLEMS

Although the legal profession has a myriad of faulty policies that invariably lead to more money for the profession 1 this site focuses on what the writer considers to be the two factors most responsible for the proliferation of lawsuits. These two factors are: 1) the lure of a cash verdict with virtually no disincentive to lie under oath; and 2) the concept of insurance, which, by the way, runs counter to the concept of economic efficiency. The lack of disincentive to lie under oath permits the filing of lawsuits which would have no merit but for a plaintiff's willingness to lie under oath, as well as the bogus defense of a meritorious lawsuit by a defendant who is willing to lie under oath. The existence of insurance companies provide the "deep pocket" of money that can induce a person willing to lie under oath to actually do so. Governmental entities (e.g., cities, counties, and towns) are also able to afford virtually any verdict against them.

Anyone who thinks that the proliferation of lawsuits does not affect them is misinformed. The existence of courts is required to hear the lawsuits, buildings are required to house the courts, judges are required to preside over them, and people such as bailiffs, clerks, secretaries, and stenographers are required to staff the courts. Many courtrooms have security that has a price tag of over a million dollars. The taxpayer foots the bill for all of these costs. Fewer lawsuits might mean that fewer courts would be necessary, and would at least mean that the courts would be less busy. The former would mean the taxpayer would be saved the cost of the court and all its supporting staff. The latter would mean that those staffing the courts would be entitled to less compensation for their services, and the burden on the taxpayer would thus be decreased. Fewer tax dollars would also be expended to defend the lower number of lawsuits against governmental entities. Even assuming the insurance industry remained the same but incentive to tell the truth was added, fewer dollars would be spent by insurance companies defending claims, which at least in theory would lead to lower insurance premiums for the consumer. Thus, virtually every taxpayer, as well as every insured motorist, stands to gain by a decrease in the number of lawsuits.

For those unfamiliar with the legal system, the person or entity that sues is called the "plaintiff," and the person or entity being sued is called the "defendant."

When a person or corporation sues, they know that successfully prosecuting the suit is going to cost money. It is highly unusual for a lawyer not to be hired. Most of the time, the lawyer will work on what is called a "contingency fee" basis. A typical arrangement is for the lawyer to take one third of the amount of any recovery by the by the plaintiff, but sometimes the percentage is higher if the case actually goes to trial. The purported rationale for a lawyer taking one third or more of a very large award is that they incur the risk of having done a lot of work for nothing in the event that the defense prevails.

When a lawsuit is filed, the party being sued generally hires a lawyer to defend it, and the potential for some pretty steep legal fees looms large. As well as filing an answer to the complaint, the defense of a lawsuit can involve the filing of and the responding to of various motions, and may include court appearances to argue them before a judge. A process known as discovery, which may involve the taking of depositions, the submission of interrogatories, or the requesting of admissions, can often become quite costly, especially when the services of experts are engaged. In the event that the case actually proceeds to trial, the time spent in court increases substantially, and with it the lawyer's fee.

When a person or corporation is sued, they know that defending the suit is going to cost them money for any or all of the above. Further, they know that this cost will occur even if the lawsuit is completely successfully defended. That is, even if the case goes all the way to trial, and the jury finds that there is no liability on the part of the defendant, the defendant will nonetheless find itself out of a tidy sum of money. That's right - winning a lawsuit from a defendant's point of view isn't quite what it's cracked up to be. Accordingly, defendants are often willing to pay the plaintiff an amount less than what it would cost to defend the suit even if they are certain that the suit will be successfully defended. This amount is sometimes referred to as nuisance value. By way of illustration, suppose party A is sued by party B for $100,000. Suppose further that A is exactly one hundred percent certain that it can take the case to trial and be found not liable for any damages whatsoever. But suppose also that A knows that it will have to pay out $10,000 in legal fees, stenographer fees for depositions, witness mileage fees, expert witness fees, etc. In theory, and often in reality, A will be willing to pay B an amount less than $10,000 to settle the case. Obviously, the sooner the case is settled the less money will have to be spent defending it, and some are settled very quickly.

Certainly, there are instances when a governmental entity (or an insurance company) should be required to compensate a party for damage to that party. Every now and then, a verdict is unreasonably large. Many (maybe all) states now have upper ceilings on verdict amounts, and maybe the ceilings are adequate to control runaway verdicts. Relatively little is said about the number of lawsuits filed for and settled for what is known as "nuisance value." Few, if anyone, have ever totaled the cost of these suits because they do not make headlines and thus do not get the attention they deserve.

TRUTHFULNESS

Obviously, if a party - either the plaintiff or the defendant - is willing to lie under oath, more lawsuits will be filed and more lawsuits will require more legal and judicial resources to defend than it would if everyone were truthful. The outcome of most lawsuits that get past the summary judgment stage turn on the credibility of witnesses. In some of these cases, a witness is sometimes merely mistaken, and not lying. However, most of the time one or more of the witnesses is not merely mistaken, but lying. Herein lies the primary culpability of the legal profession. The fact of the matter is that there is very little - if any - disincentive to lie under oath. Balanced against the lure of an often substantial sum of money are only a person's general principles and the consequences of the oath.

Photo unavailable

The consequences of the oath are twofold: and 1) in theory, it exposes the believer to penalties imposed by his or her deity; and 2) it exposes the witness to penalties for perjury. With regard to the first, as things now stand, it is readily apparent that absent effective penalties for perjury, the least scrupulous party has a distinct advantage over a well-principled one. Permit an illustration with an excerpt from Stowe's Uncle Tom's Cabin: "Well, I've got just as much conscience as any man in business can afford to keep, - just a little, you know, to swear by, as it ‘twere …." 2 The fiction might just be less outrageous than reality here. There is a concept in the legal profession known as a "swearing contest." A swearing contest is a dispute in which determining a vital fact involves the credibility choice between one witness's word and another's - the two being irreconcilably in conflict and there being no other evidence. In such a dispute, the factfinder is thought generally to believe such as a police officer over a convicted drug-dealer. 3

At least several justices of the Supreme Court of the United States have acknowledged the existence of "swearing contests." Most disturbingly, many occur in the context of a criminal case and involve the testimony of police officers. One might think that cops would have more integrity than to lie under oath. However, it should be noted that the Supreme Court has noted that a motive to falsely testify exists because "ferreting out crime" is often a "competitive enterprise." 4This should lead one to inquire that if we cannot trust cops to tell the truth, who can we trust? Also of interest is that in the United States, cops are typically not permitted to accept cash payment of a traffic ticket or other infraction. This results in the insertion of a "middleman" to collect the fines, a middleman who must be paid for his or her services. (The practice is different in Mexico, and the Mexican "federales" are reputed in America for being corrupt.) In all candor, if we cannot trust our police officers with the relatively trivial sums for infractions, how can we trust them in matters of the utmost importance? And if we can trust them, why are we using middle men (typically the court clerk)?

The fact of the matter is that notwithstanding personal testimony to the contrary, there are either many non-believers, or else believers who think that the worldly reward for lying under oath outweighs the religious consequences for lying under oath. Just consider the typical civil case. The same consideration necessarily yields the result that witnesses are less than impressed with the penalties for perjury. What follows are three possible reasons for this obvious lack of fear, all of which are in the complete control of the legal profession: 1) perjury charges are seldom filed for false testimony, especially considering that in the typical civil case that goes to trial someone is lying; 2) the crime of perjury is narrowly circumscribed, and not all knowingly false testimony is even subject to penalty for perjury; and 3) the penalties for perjury are not severe enough.

If anyone disagrees with the naked assertion that perjury charges are seldom filed, they should feel free to check the criminal docket in the courts for their county. The paucity of perjury charges is difficult to understand due to the fact that in many, many cases, the witnesses on opposing sides give different versions of the events that led to the suit being filed or the criminal charge being filed. It is highly unlikely that more than a few of the versions differ due to an honest mistake on the part of the witness who testifies inaccurately. It is very clear that not nearly as many perjury charges have been filed as the number of perjuries that have occurred. It should be noted that the state of mind requirement - the witness must know that he is testifying falsely - can sometimes be difficult to prove, especially where the testimony is an opinion. There have been at least some high-profile instances, however, where the knowledge of falsity was not at all difficult to prove, but no charges were filed. Two prominent examples are that Clinton was clearly guilty notwithstanding his pretense of belief that fellatio was not sex, and that a psychiatrist nicknamed "Dr. Death" - James Grigson - was clearly guilty of giving a knowingly false opinion in the death penalty phase of Texas v. Randall Dale Adams. 5

The crime of perjury has been circumscribed fairly narrowly. It should be noted that the same standards apply to both criminal and civil cases. (Substitute "liability" for "guilt".) Perjury is providing false testimony under oath or affirmation concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide such false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory. 6 Note that all evidence must be relevant to be admissible. Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." 7However, not every instance of false relevant testimony given under oath is perjury. 8 The testimony must also be material before it can be actionable for perjury. Evidence is material when "if believed, would tend to influence or affect the issue under determination." 9 This has been interpreted to mean that false testimony is material if it is "'designed to substantially affect the outcome of the case.'" 10 Phrased differently (and more restrictively), false testimony is material when it is "crucial to the question of guilt or innocence." 11 At least one court has held that "prevarications on the details cannot be considered crucial to the question of guilt." 12 Thus it is seen that requiring the testimony to be material as well as relevant before a perjury charge can attach permits the witness to knowingly lie under oath without fear of penalty for perjury in some instances.

It is difficult to understand the added requirement of materiality. From a culpability standpoint, how is a witness who lies under oath about a relevant but immaterial matter any less culpable than one who lies about a relevant and material matter? Is it a defense to a perjury charge that the alleged perjurer knew his relevant testimony was false, but that he did not know that it was material? The requirement is particularly difficult to understand in the context of deposition upon oral examination. The standard there is that a question may be asked if it is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 13 The materiality requirement, however, would appear to grant to the deponent carte blanche to lie under oath about relevant matters that are not admissible but nonetheless calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. What's the purpose of permitting the question if the deponent may lie with impunity to prevent the discovery of admissible evidence? Is a lawyer required to inform his client that he may lie under these circumstances in order to represent his client zealously? The absurdity of the situation should now be apparent.

The assertion that the penalties for perjury are inadequate constitutes an opinion, and not a fact. However, the following should be considered before the opinion is rejected. Take Indiana as an example. Under the Indiana penal code, perjury is a low-level felony, and is punishable by a range of six months to two and one-half years. All of the prescribed sentence may be suspended to probation. Furthermore, the perjurer may be sentenced as a misdemeanant.

Thus, a plaintiff tempted to lie under oath in order to win a sum of money is faced with only the disincentive of the unlikely filing of a criminal charge for perjury, the mere possibility of conviction in the unlikely event that a charge is actually filed, and a probable slap on the wrist in the event he is convicted. The same holds true for a defendant who is tempted to lie under oath in order to save a sum of money. Small wonder, then, that so many people are willing to lie under oath.

THE DEEP POCKET

Now we come to the role of insurance. Although a lot of what will be said applies to insurance in general, the focus here is on automobile insurance. The insurance company provides what is known in the legal profession as "the deep pocket." All that is meant by the phrase "deep pocket" is somebody who can actually pay the amount of the verdict in the event a favorable one is obtained. Although the goal of compensating a faultless motorist for damages incurred as the result of the poor driving of some other motorist is a noble one, it is easy to see that this goal is not the primary reason for automobile insurance as it now exists. Just look at how inadequate the Worker's Compensation acts for the various states have historically been. Indeed, the rationale for this inadequacy is that before the benign legislatures enacted them, the courts were closing the door to recompense from the legal system.

Photo unavailable

For most people, the long-run cost of being insured is greater than the long-run cost of remaining uninsured. When a motorist is insured, the cost of his policy must reflect not only the probability of his being involved in accidents times the expected amount of damage due to the accidents, but also the insurance company's operating expenses (agent's commissions, claims adjustors salaries, etc.) as well as its profit. This means that an insured actually pays more than the expected outcome of his driving with regard to accidents, etc., and the question thus arises as to why he would do that (aside from the fact that state law typically mandates it). The explanation for people's desire to be insured in general is that people are risk averse in general. Risk aversion is the reluctance of a person to accept a bargain with an uncertain payoff rather than another bargain with a more certain, but possibly lower, expected payoff. There is no question that many people are risk averse, and that they would purchase an insurance policy even if not required to do so by law.

A moment's thought reveals that the assertion that people are generally risk averse is inconsistent at the most basic level with the assertion that people do not drive less carefully because they are insured. A further inconsistency inheres in premising liability in event of an accident upon fault. One of the policies behind tort law has always been to encourage people to exercise reasonable care. Does this policy not apply to motorists? If so, how is it served by premising liability upon fault if people do not drive more carefully under threat of having to pay out more money? And in this situation, the motorist stands to lose only the amount of the deductible and higher future premiums. How about the decrease in drunk driving resulting from more stringent enforcement of the laws against drunk driving? At least for first-time offenders, the only jail time involved is the six hours it takes to "sober up." It is the cost of defending a criminal charge for drunk driving, not the threat of jail time, that has reduced the number of drunk drivers. If fewer people drive drunk due to the threat of having to pay the cost of a criminal defense, how can it be said that people would not drive more carefully if the cost of any accident they were in came entirely out of their own pocket? How about the increased care in parking lots now that air bags may be deployed in the event of even a relatively minor collision? Is that not the result of the threat of more money being paid out than was customary in the past for a "fender bender"? It is clear that people would drive more carefully if they knew that the cost of an accident would come out of their pocket rather than being spread across several thousand policy holders. Indeed, researchers of this situation have determined that it falls within the term "the moral hazard problem."

Note also that there is a general theory called risk compensation, which, if true, comports fully with the assertion here that people who are insured drive less carefully than they would if they were not insured. 14 Note also that this decrease in the level of carefulness can affect people other than the motorist. 15

So who benefits financially from the way automobile insurance is currently structured? Just make a list of the people who are happy. Obviously, the lawyers are happy. Once again, every case filed requires the participation of two lawyers and a judge. It is easy to see that the virtual absence of any disincentive to lie under oath combined with the deep pocket represented by insurance companies has resulted in a gold mine for the legal profession. The concept of nuisance value has previously been discussed. There is a reason that the neck braces that were so popular in the 1980s and 1990s were called "lawyer's collars." Knee injuries were also popular. When somebody involved in an accident says "it hurts" doctors are only too happy to prescribe a painkiller, which also makes the pharmaceutical companies happy. Not unhappy are the policy holders - their companies are the ones "fighting" on their behalf. Only when the collision involves two motorists insured by the same company does the potential exist for either motorist to become unhappy. The big losers are the taxpayer who must foot the cost of the increase in caseload for the court system, as well as the policy holders not part of the accident whose premiums go up as a result of payouts made by insurance companies to people either not legitimately injured or those who exaggerate their injury.

It is to say the least interesting to compare the goal of fully compensating a faultless motorist with the history of the worker's compensation acts of the various states. Even today, they fall considerably short of fully compensating a worker for an employer's negligence, and they were formerly considerably worse. The fact is that nobody ever even claimed that the worker was being fully compensated, and the failure to do so was justified by the fact that before the worker's compensation acts the courts were so hostile to the workers' negligence suits that the worker never got anything by way of compensation anyway. The difference in approach is reconciled by examining who foots the bill. In the area of automobile insurance, the policy holder and the taxpayer foot it - in the accident at the workplace area, the employer formerly was responsible, and currently remains at least partly responsible. Any claim by the legal profession or the insurance industry that things are the way they are due to the desire to fully compensate the faultless motorist should be viewed with an extremely jaundiced eye, especially in light of the facts that it is economically inefficient and results in an enormous sum of money for the legal profession.

WHAT TO DO

Obviously, there must be a serious effort made to ensure that witnesses (especially the parties to the suit) testify truthfully. First, lawyers should be required to require their clients to submit to a polygraph examination. This requirement would weed out all those willing to lie under oath, and eliminate the needless use of judicial resources on their account. The validity of the polygraph has already been decided by the U.S. Congress, as well as Ronald Reagan. There is a law entitled the Employee Polygraph Protection Act (EPPA). The Department of Labor summarized the EPPA thusly:

The EPPA prohibits most private employers from using lie detector tests, either for pre-employment screening or during the course of employment. Employers generally may not require or request any employee or job applicant to take a lie detector test, or discharge, discipline, or discriminate against an employee or job applicant for refusing to take a test or for exercising other rights under the Act. Employers may not use or inquire about the results of a lie detector test or discharge or discriminate against an employee or job applicant on the basis of the results of a test, or for filing a complaint, or for participating in a proceeding under the Act. Subject to restrictions, the Act permits polygraph (a type of lie detector) tests to be administered to certain job applicants of security service firms (armored car, alarm, and guard) and of pharmaceutical manufacturers, distributors and dispensers.
Subject to restrictions, the Act also permits polygraph testing of certain employees of private firms who are reasonably suspected of involvement in a workplace incident (theft, embezzlement, etc.) that resulted in specific economic loss or injury to the employer. Where polygraph examinations are allowed, they are subject to strict standards for the conduct of the test, including the pretest, testing and post-testing phases. An examiner must be licensed and bonded or have professional liability coverage. The Act strictly limits the disclosure of information obtained during a polygraph test. 16
Necessarily implicit in the Department of Labor's summary is it's assertion that polygraph examinations are reliable. Clarence Thomas, current justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, also lent credibility to the polygraph examination when, during the Senate confirmation hearings, he was asked if he was willing to take a polygraph examination. Thomas responded, "I will if you will." (And this in the face of Anita Hill having passed one!)

The validity of the polygraph examination has thus been accepted by the law. Given this acceptance, it is difficult to understand why the results of a polygraph examination are generally inadmissible into evidence in a court of law, at least from a non-pecuniary point of view. The reason given by the legal profession for the inadmissibility of the results is that the average juror will have a tendency to place too much emphasis on the result and not give proper weight to any evidence not consistent with the result of the test. For the sake of this site, it may be assumed that the reason proffered by the legal profession justifies the exclusion of the test result from evidence. However, the proffered reason does not even apply to the situation where a lawyer requires his client to submit to the polygraph before a lawsuit is even filed, since no juror will ever hear about the result.

The chances of this happening are so close to zero that they might as well be. The reason is obvious. If fewer lies are permitted in a legal proceeding, there will be fewer legal proceedings. In turn, there will be less demand for the legal services of lawyers, which should at least in theory result in either fewer lawyers or lower legal fees or both. Do you really think that lawyers even might do that to their own profession? The bottom line here is that even though a myriad of employees have lost their jobs due to polygraph examinations, we are certainly not going to have lawyers lose their jobs to due to polygraphs, at least not while the legal profession continues to be self-regulating.

Second, the legal profession should utilize the crime of perjury differently than is currently the case. Perjury charges should be filed against the loser of a civil lawsuit way more often than they currently are. It is axiomatic that one of the goals of the criminal justice system is to deter others from committing the same crime by making an example of the offender. The legal system makes far too few examples. The standard for materiality needs to be modified and possibly eliminated. From a criminal state of mind point of view, there is little if any reason for excusing one lie under oath and punishing another, and letting some lies under oath go unpunished only encourages more lying. The penalties for perjury should be increased. The cold, hard fact is that in most of the myriad of lawsuits contested past the level of summary judgment, one of the parties is lying about a material matter under oath. The fact that so many people are willing to commit perjury, without more, means the penalties for perjury are inadequate. Of course, it would seem on the surface that filing more cases for perjury would increase the total number of cases filed. It should be obvious, however, that once it became known that perjury charges really might be filed, fewer people will be willing to commit it, and then both the number of civil suits as well as criminal perjury cases will decrease. That is, after all, what the concept of general deterrence is all about.

Once again, the chances of any changes being made here are virtually non-existent. We are always going to have a lot of well educated, good-looking, impeccably dressed people (and many of them thump the Bible) telling us with the utmost sincerity that the system works just fine, and that the reason we have an overabundance of lawsuits is that we live in a litigious society. That is to say, it is all society's fault. Of course, the fact that lawyers make so much money from society's litigiousness is a complete coincidence.

It has become obvious that somebody other than lawyers should be the ones to regulate the legal profession. The anomaly presented by the facts that the US has more lawyers per capita than any other country and that lawyers in the US are more highly paid than the lawyers of any other country cannot be explained by the supposed fact that we live in a litigious society. This situation runs contrary to the law of supply and demand, and the increase in legal fees over the last two decades notwithstanding the steady and voluminous stream of law school graduates amply demonstrates this. Remember when death penalty proponents used to argue that it should be imposed to avoid the cost of incarcerating a murderer for life. Now death penalty opponents cite the enormous legal fees involved in the defending somebody against whom the death penalty is sought as a reason not to impose it. Really, what did they think was going to happen in a society where the basic assumption underlying its economic system is that a person will act to maximize his own self-interest given any opportunity whatsoever to do so. (And nobody more so than lawyers.) The best that can be said for the legal profession is that it has merely enabled people to lie under oath either for pecuniary profit or to avoid pecuniary loss. Maybe the reason so few perjury charges are filed is that entrapment would be a built-in defense. A big reason that few, if any, lawyers "rock the boat" is that any disciplinary complaint filed against them is handled by lawyers acting under the auspices of other lawyers.

With regard to the deep pocket (oops, I mean the insurance companies), it should obvious that our current concept of automobile insurance needs restructuring. Even if it is real rather than pretextual - remember that J. P. Morgan said, "A man always has two reasons for doing anything: a good reason and the real reason" - the noble objective of fully compensating a faultless motorist has become far too costly a goal to attain. As things now stand, the insurance industry looks like nothing so much as a gold mine for the legal profession.

______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________


FOOTNOTES

1. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 US 773 (1975) was a case where the Fairfax County Bar Association in the State of Virginia published a minimum fee schedule and suggested that habitual violation of it raised the possibility of misconduct against the recalcitrant lawyer, thus effectively precluding a lawyer from charging less than the suggested fee. The effect on price competition of this schedule and threat of discipline for the violation thereof is obvious. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 US 350 (1977) was a case where the Supreme Court of the United States held a proscription against advertising by lawyers unconstitutional as violative of the First Amendment. Obviously, the rule against advertising made it considerably more difficult for relatively new attorneys to compete with those already established. No points for the Supreme Court here - in Bates they closed the door previously opened in Goldfarb to claims that the legal profession was subject to the Sherman Act in general. This is exactly the sort of result to be expected when a profession is permitted to regulate itself.
2. Haley the slave trader in Harriet Beecher Stowe, Uncle Tom's Cabin, The Modern Library, New York, 1996, p. 5.
3. Black's Law Dictionary
4. Johnson v. US, 330 US 10, 14 (1948)
5. Texas v. Randall Dale Adams is the subject of a documentary entitled The Thin Blue Line. The circumstances under which Dr. Death testified are more disturbing than merely opining without basis that Randall Dale Adams would commit violent crimes in the event he were released from prison. How does one disprove an opinion like that? To be disproved, it was necessary that Adams actually be released, which is extremely unlikely in a Texas death penalty case. Also, it may be that Dr. Death was hiding behind the practice of the psychiatric profession of interviewing military inductees for an even briefer period of time than Dr. Death interviewed Adams.
6. 18 USC Section 1621 states: Whoever - (1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true; or (2) in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code, willfully subscribes as true any material matter which he does not believe to be true; is guilty of perjury and shall, except as otherwise expressly provided by law, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. This section is applicable whether the statement or subscription is made within or without the United States. See also United States v. Stokes, 211 F.3d 1039, 1045 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993). Although the examples given here are from the federal system, state laws against perjury are largely similar, perhaps due to the influence of the Model Penal Code, although it would appear that the states generally impose more lenient sentences.
7. Rule 401, Federal Rules of Evidence
8. See, e.g., United States v. Gage, 183 F.3d 711, 715 (7th Cir. 1999)
9. U.S. v. Arambula, 238 F. 3d 865 (2001), citing the federal sentencing guidelines for obstruction of justice which includes perjury).
10. United States v. Galbraith, 200 F.3d 1006, 1014 (7th Cir. 2000)
11. See id.; Senn, 129 F.3d at 898 (quoting Mustread, 42 F.3d at 1106); see also United States v. Craig, 178 F.3d 891, 901-02 (7th Cir. 1999) (affirming obstruction enhancement where defendant falsely denied recruiting fictitious students in large scam because denial was material "to the question of her guilt").
12. U.S. v. Arambula, 238 F. 3d 865 (2001).
13. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26(b)(1).
14. Sam Peltzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, Journal of Political Economy, 1975).
15. David R. Martinelli; Maria-Paulina Diosdado-De-La-Pena. "Safety Externalities of SUVs on Passenger Cars: An Analysis Of the Peltzman Effect Using FARS Data". West Virginia University 2008. ""In general, safety regulation did decrease the probability of death for drivers, but this is offset by involving themselves in a riskier behavior, which reassigns the change of deaths from vehicle occupants to pedestrians"
16. http://www.dol.gov/whd/polygraph/

Back to main page.