"What, excepting torture, would produce insanity quicker than this treatment?"

Nellie Bly, Ten Days at the Mad-House



One cannot do to a dog today the things that the psychiatric profession has done to human beings in the past. Electro-convulsive therapy and a psychosurgical procedure known as a lobotomy are two examples of what were once mainstream procedures of the psychiatric profession in America. That these procedures ever attained that status is remarkable - the Nazis were cited for war crimes for deploying them experimentally. That these practices - or, for that matter, any other practices - ever cured anybody of anything is at best questionable. Indeed, there have been many epic failures, and of these, many have been highly publicized.

The prominence of these procedures despite their barbaric nature and dubious efficacy is easily understood when it is seen that the mental health profession was - and still is - first and foremost an institution of political control. The control was achieved by the threat - sometimes even the explicit threat - of labelling a dissident as insane and thus placing him or her in line for the barbaric procedures of dubious efficacy. This threat thus has value as both a general and specific deterrent, in much the same manner as prison specifically and generally deters crime. In simplest terms, after a dissident is punished for his dissidence, he specifically will be less likely to voice dissent, and after an example has been made of the dissident, fewer people in general will be willing to take the risk of dissenting.

Photo unavailable

One might be tempted to believe that electro-convulsive therapy and the lobotomy would be the two most remarkable aspects of psychiatry in America, and with good reason. However, the most remarkable aspect of psychiatry in America has been the fact that it has always operated and continues to operate without the constraints of the first amendment freedom of religion and the first amendment freedom of speech. Those acquainted with constitutional law will note that Gitlow v. New York, the Supreme Court case most commonly credited with enforcing the federal Bill of Rights against the states, was not decided until 1925. However, the states each had (and still have) their own constitutions, and these state constitutions also have guarantees for the rights of an individual much the same as those contained in the federal Bill of Rights. Thus, even though the federal constitution had yet to be applied to actions taken by representatives of states or municipalities before 1925, there was never any question that the constitutions of the various states could have applied. Thus, statements that cannot be the basis for a criminal conviction, or even pecuniary liability, have nonetheless been the basis for a diagnosis of mental illness.

The purpose of this website is to discredit the American segment of the psychiatric profession. A psychiatric insider once said, "The history of psychology is largely constituted of a succession of fads overlying the continuity given by a few technological methods which have been progressively misapplied with little critical concern for their social, political, or scientific consequences.” 1 While it is true that the history of psychology is largely constituted of a succession of fads overlying the continuity given by a few technological methods which have been progressively misapplied, it will be shown here that its primary purpose is political, and the fact that the First Amendment has been consistently and universally ignored furnishes at least some evidence of its political purpose.


The first and most prominent connection between psychiatry and politics pertains to garnering public support for war efforts. This support involves both willingness to fund and willingness to engage in actual combat. That the psychiatric profession has been deployed to stifle dissent against war efforts is beyond debate. Indeed, it appears that substantially increased activity within the psychiatric profession has historically signaled that a war effort was forthcoming. It will be seen that by no later than the Revolutionary War there was a psychological malady called "tory rot" that purportedly afflicted those opposed to fighting for independence. It will be seen that this malady was publicized in 1812, right on time for the War of 1812. It will be seen that a proliferation of asylums as well as a shift in paradigm regarding treatment of the insane occurred in the early 1830s, and that this shift in paradigm as well as the proliferation of insane asylums was directly related to preparation for the armed conflicts which were then looming on the horizon. It will be seen that the precursor to the American Psychiatric Association was established in 1844, the year that James K. Polk was elected under the slogan "54° 40' or fight". It will be seen that at least one state created its mental health system just in time for World War I, and, further, that an express threat to label a prominent politician as mentally ill for objecting to U.S. entry into the war enjoyed wide newspaper circulation. It will be seen that convulsive therapy was resurrected in 1934, shortly after Hitler rose to power. It will be seen that electro-convulsive therapy (a refinement of convulsive therapy) was first used in 1938, shortly before World War II began. Finally it will be seen that the decrease in necessary numbers of armed servicemen has resulted in a broadening of the definition of mentally ill to the point where today the notion of "mental disorder" is so broad that it is doubtful an army the size of that in World War I could even be raised.

The nature of the undeniable connection between the psychiatric profession and war is also clear. It consists of deterring resistance to the war effort, be that resistance a refusal to engage in combat or merely oral protestation. It accomplishes this by presenting the would-be resister with the possibility of some unpleasant consequences of resisting. The primary unpleasant consequence is being labelled deranged or insane or mentally ill or whatever term is fashionable, and then incarcerated in an asylum or mental institution or whatever term is fashionable. The label, standing alone, had an extremely important consequence – insane persons were formerly incompetent to testify in court under the laws of the states. The label was thus tantamount to a bull’s-eye on the back of the labelled if he chose to remain non-compliant. (Now insane persons are permitted to testify – it’s just that they have a rather severe credibility problem.) Treatment of the insane in Early America was notoriously unpleasant, in many instances falling to the level of inhumane. It is easy to see how resistance could be deterred by these consequences.

Psychiatry has always been a major asset in Uncle Sam’s recruiting efforts. Dr. Benjamin Rush is referred to as the “Father of Psychiatry in America.” He authored a book entitled Medical Inquiries and Observations, Upon the Diseases of the Mind (hereinafter Diseases of the Mind). This writer regards the book as akin to a “smoking gun.” It is possible to read the book for free online, and if ever the reader feels the need to be entertained, he may do so by visiting the website footnoted below. 2 According to Rush’s Diseases of the Mind, the some of our colonists were afflicted by a form of derangement known as “tory rot.” Most tellingly, the malady was “confined exclusively to those friends of Great Britain, and to those timid Americans, who took no public part in the war.” 3 The disease could be fatal. Also most tellingly, the malady known as tory rot “passed away with the events of the American revolution.” 4 Rush also noted the Russian cure for the mental illness of some of its soldiers labelled homesickness. After several soldiers suffering from homesickness were buried alive, the malady abruptly departed. 5 Rush published his book in 1812, and, especially given the reluctance of some of the several States to participate in what is now known as the War of 1812, the timing is almost certainly not coincidental.

It is important to note that while Rush expressed the utmost confidence in the ability to cure diseases of the mind, none of his so-called cures really worked, unless the docility induced by opium can be termed a cure. That’s right – one of Rush’s remedies for a variety of “diseases of the mind” was opium.

Now jump forward a couple of decades. Regardless of whether the concept be called expansionism, continentalism, or Manifest Destiny, by 1830 the United States government was pursuing it ruthlessly. Armed conflicts with four different militants were on the American radar: 1) the Indians; 2) the British; 3) the Mexicans; and 4) each other. Although war with the British was ultimately averted, the U.S prepared for it extensively. Indeed, the extent to which it did prepare may have been what induced the British to agree to the terms of the Treaty of Oregon. The other three armed conflicts all occurred.

The process of raising an army then differed from that of today, or even when the draft was in effect. The first federal conscription did not occur until the Civil War. Up until then, the individual states were expected to raise and maintain militias, from which combatants for the national army could be selected in the event that the necessity arose. Everyone knew that support for the imminent war efforts would not be universal.

In 1830, the United States government took a giant step toward the goal of expansion. In that year, the Indian Removal Act was passed by both the House of Representatives and the Senate, and signed into law by President Andrew Jackson. Under the terms of the Indian Removal Act, the vast majority of Native Americans living east of the Mississippi were relocated to tracts of land granted them west of the Mississippi. The act contained a proviso which became operative in the event the Indians “became extinct.” Under this proviso, the land granted to the Indians who “became extinct” reverted to the United States. The passage of this act resulted in a considerable reaction. While many whites who advocated removal supported its passage, many others did not, and numerous petitions were submitted to Congress in opposition to the act.

Although a lot of the groundwork for a prospective war against Britain had already been laid by then, the prospects for a war with Britain were very public by 1844. Indeed, James K. Polk's campaign platform included the slogan "54° 40' or fight". In the northeastern states, there was every reason to anticipate a substantial amount of dissent against any war with the British. There had been talk of seceding from the Union and alignment with the British since no later than 1804. In New England, and especially in Massachusetts anti-War of 1812 sentiment was the rule rather than the exception, and at least several congressional representatives officially opposed the war. In 1844, there was every reason to believe that this same anti-war with the British sentiment still existed, congressional representatives excepted.

Consider some developments in the field of psychiatry during this period. Prior to 1830, there were a total of four mental institutions in America. These were only for people who could afford them. Of those who could not afford them, many were cared for in the home by relatives. If homecare was not an option, county almshouses would provide care in addition to the other services it provides for the "paupers." Insane persons that were considered dangerous were kept in jail. Apparently physical restraints - mostly shackles and chains - were commonplace for the insane in the jail environment, and apparently beatings were not unheard of. 6 In or about 1830, what became known as the "moral treatment" became the fashion in treatment for the mentally ill. On the surface, the moral treatment was a substantial improvement over previous practice, and there is no question that it benefitted (benefitted - not cured) many who were genuinely mentally ill. It has been partially described thusly:

Moral treatment meant kind, individualized care in a small hospital; resort to occupational therapy, religious exercises, amusement and games; repudiation in large measure of all threats of physical violence; and only infrequent application of mechanical restraints. 7

So far, so good. However, it is essential to note that institutionalization was required. This requirement was ominous for three reasons. First, the company of other insane persons is in no way therapeutic. Indeed, according to Nelly Bly, prolonged cohabitation with them will result in insanity for the cohabitant even if he or she were sane in the first instance. Second, insane persons were incompetent as witnesses at common law. Thus, one important result of the requirement of institutionalization was that only the superintendent and the employees of an asylum could testify with regard to any alleged abuse of its patients. Given the reputation of treatment for the mentally ill at that time, the institutionalization requirement would have raised a red flag for any would-be dissident. Third, those removed from the home or the almshouses were in the same economic class as those most likely to do the actual fighting in any future war, and thus who would be most likely to object to any future war.

A proliferation of insane asylums occurred contemporaneously with the shift in paradigm to the moral treatment. 8 It is a common misconception that America's mental health system originated as a result of the efforts of Dorothea Dix. Wrong for two reasons. First, even prior to 1830, there were a handful or so of mental institutions in America. These were only for people who could afford them. Of those who could not afford them, many were cared for in the home by relatives, or even by unrelated families that received a subsidy. If homecare was not an option, county almshouses provided care for the insane in addition to the other services it provided for "paupers." As has been previously noted, insane persons that were considered dangerous were kept in jail. Secondly, the fact is that Dix's efforts were "part of a nationwide trend toward the proliferation of mental health hospitals providing moral treatment." 9 This trend would have occurred without Dix, or even anyone like her. Several states erected insane asylums without any assistance from Dix. In 1843, the Massachusetts legislature virtually ignored Dix in opting to expand the asylum already extant at Worcester. 10 In 1844, New York added some facilities to those that already existed, but "Dix played no significant part" regarding them. 11 She did assist in Rhode Island, New Jersey (1845), Pennsylvania (1845), and Kentucky, and claimed to have "[set] the ball in motion" in Illinois. 12 In those states where she did assist, her assistance for the most part consisted of petitions to and appearnces before the state legislatures. It is at best doubtful whether she ever aroused enough public support in favor of her proposals to constitute a majority, not even in New Jersey. 13 It appears that she was substantially less involved with similar work in the southern states. Her efforts in Tennessee have been descibed as "a working holiday." 14 Her efforts in Alabama appear to have been confined to sharing information with the president of Alabama's medical society. 15 The bottom line is that it was not Dix who was responsible for the proliferation, but rather the state legislatures, and often (maybe always - she was unable to attain a majority amongst the constituents even in New Jersey 16) without the support of the majority of their constituents at that. Without question, Dix's primary humanitarian contribution was either illuminating or exaggerating the treatment of insane paupers, depending upon whether credibility is assigned to Dix or her detractors.

Reitierating, it is easy to attribute an impure motive for the shift in paradigm to the moral treatment. One rationale justifying the imposition of the moral treatment was that at least in some cases, the mental illness was ascribed to immoral behavior, and it was necessary to change the patient's atmosphere in order to change the patient's behavior. This rationale was used to justify not only relocating insane paupers from the almshouse to the asylum, but also to relocate insane persons from the home to the asylum. Seeming nobility of the moral treatment aside, this last fact would have sounded an ominous note to anyone living in the era. Consider the following two facts. First, most (and maybe all) of those who would be relocated from either jail, the almshouse, or the home were those who could not afford to be cared for in the insane asylums then extant. They thus shared membership in the same economic class as those who would do the actual fighting in any future war, and thus who would be most likely to object to any future war. Second, insane persons were incompetent to testify in court at common law. Housing them all in an asylum that housed only those who had been adjudged insane thus limited the witnesses to any occurrences there to the superintendent and his typically small staff. These two facts cannot be disputed.

Moreover, at least several contradictions result from any attempt to attribute the proliferation of asylums and the shift in paradigm to humanitarianism. In the first place, there are too many instances where our beloved government was anything but humane to believe the humanitarian motive in this instance. See, for example, the practice of slavery in the South with the cooperation (see especially the Fugitive Slave Act) of the North, and the extinction clause of the Removal Act of 1830. The following quote from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. should suffice to negate any argument that the inhumanity pertained solely to racial minorities: "I loathe the thick-fingered clowns we call the people - especially as the beasts are represented at political centres - vulgar, selfish & base ...." 17 Secondly, even in the asylums in the North, blacks were cared for separately and inferiorly,18 a practice that completely undermines any notion of a war conducted "in defense of the right" and which is inhumane on its face. Thirdly, while it was deemed essential to relocate mentally ill paupers from the almshouses to the asylum to maximize the chances of a cure, many of the asylums provided care levels based upon ability to pay. That is to say, in some asylums, people who could afford to pay received preferential treatment over those who could not afford to pay. This practice also militates against the motive for relocating the pauper from the almshouse to the asylum being humanitarian. Fourthly, those patients with senile dementia were not removed from the home. Regarding those who were institutionalized and never cared for at home, the shrinks were of the opinion that "[k]indness, sympathy, humanity dictate that their waning existence should be made cheerful and attractive by all the attentions of home, family, and friends."19 In fairness to the shrinks, it was accurately believed that these people were beyond a cure, and were therefore not best served by institutionalization. It should be noted, however, that nobody suffering from senile dementia would ever have been required to fight, and further that no other class of insane persons was similarly treated. Finally, the asylum built in Rhode Island was funded in large part by a large donation from Cyrus Butler, a millionaire with a reputation for "brusque indifference to charity."20 His uncharacteristic generosity certainly can be explained in a manner consistent with his reputation if he regarded his contribution as utilitarianistic rather than charitable.

Furthermore, and perhaps even more telling than the contradictions listed immediately above is the intuitively obvious assertion that the company of the insane is in no way therapeutic. The further assertion here is that this seemingly obvious problem with the new paradigm is one reason that the moral treatment was ultimately regarded as a failure.21 In sum, it is clear that the new paradigm was perfectly tailored to stifle anti-war dissent. Given the contradictions presented by a claim that the shift in paradigm and the proliferation of asylums were motivated by humanitarian concerns, any such claim must be viewed with a jaundiced eye. The failure of the moral treatment renders the purported humanitarian motive of shifting the treatment paradigm to the moral treatment still more dubious. Indeed, if the assertion here regarding the obviousness of the company of the insane not being therapeutic is correct, then the failure was foreseen at the outset, and the motive for the shift in paradigm could not have been pure. It appears as though the impure motive was the real one. Shunting the credit to Dix had the benefit of making it more difficult to accuse the legislature of being motivated by a desire to stifle protest against the wars looming on the horizon.

Two developments that occurred before and during the Civil War appear on their face to pertain only to religion, but pertain even more forcefully to the war effort. One was the institutionalization of a few followers of William Miller, who predicted that the second coming of Christ would occur in 1844. Jesus’s failure to appear caused what is known as the “Great Disappointment.” Newspaper reports of instances of alleged insanity due to Millerism began to appear in 1842, and were abundant by 1843. As noted by one author, any instance of alleged insanity due to Millerism was copied “from Dan to Beersheba.” Many of the reports were simply completely untrue. In other cases, people who were legitimately mentally ill but whose mental illness was unrelated to Millerism were nevertheless reported to have become insane due to Millerism.22 The accounts did have two contributions to the war effort: 1) they offered an explanation for any dramatic increase in civil commitments which might have occurred had the war everybody was gearing up for actually occurred; and 2) they demonstrated that a civil commitment could occur for an “improper” exercise of a right guaranteed by the First Amendment.

Photo unavailable

The second development was the case of Elizabeth Packard. She was committed by her husband to a mental institution in Illinois, where she was diagnosed as a monomaniac. Her purported illness involved her views toward Calvinist Christianity that were precedented but that were not mainstream. Her commitment was accomplished via a provision in Illinois law that permitted a husband to circumvent the due process required in all other cases in the event he could get a superintendent of an asylum to agree that the wife was insane. When she was released due to alleged incurability three years later, her husband confined her to her room and forbade her to see visitors. Elizabeth Packard filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, and the case was tried by a jury of Packard’s peers. It took the jury nine minutes to determine that Packard was sane. (Elizabeth Packard spent a goodly part of her remaining life advocating the elimination of monomania – including intellectual monomania – as a mental illness.) The ability of an Illinois husband to commit his wife with about the same process as that which is required to seize a refrigerator is most accurately viewed as a perquisite favoring husbands who, after all, constituted prospective combatants. The same is true for all other legal advantages given to the male in general and the husband in particular, including the right to discipline corporally for disobedience as well as the right to all income of the wife.

The developments within the American component of the psychiatric profession before and during the Civil War are more even ominous than those of the 1840s. Obviously, the prospect of the loss of human life attends the prospect of any war in general. The Civil War was more problematic than war in general for at least two reasons. The first reason is that the war was fought after the southern states seceded. The act of secession necessarily implies lack of consent to be governed. Thus, Union soldiers were fighting for the antithesis of the American ideal of government by the consent of the governed. The second reason is that American combatants were fighting and killing other American combatants.

The Civil War years saw a trend by some in the media to depreciate the value of human life. The Atlantic Monthly published an article by Charles Eliot Norton, which, believe it or not, contained the following excerpt regarding the value of human life:

We have thought it braver to save it than to spend it; and a questionable humanity has undoubtedly led us sometimes into feeble sentimentalities, and false estimates of its value….[T]he first sacrifice for which war calls is life; and we must revise our estimates of its value, if we would conduct our war to a happy end.23

This sentiment is hardly shocking when read against the background of the preceding statement of Oliver Wendell Holmes. This media trend was adopted by the psychiatric profession. Indeed, prominent members of the profession opined that soldiering in what Augustine would have termed a just war actually promoted good mental health.24 The justness of the war from the Northern – and the Northern psychiatrist’s - point of view was, of course, that it was being waged to abolish slavery. Ironically, in 1851 Samuel Cartwright's (a Southern physician) had designated a slave's urge to run away from his master as a mental illness called drapetomania.

It is important to note that history records the “moral treatment” as a failure. Two reasons have been given for the failure: 1) “lack of inspired leadership after the death of its innovators;” and 2) overcrowding.25 Given what the psychiatric profession claims to know today, it is difficult to see how the moral treatment could ever have been successful except as custodial care, notwithstanding then contemporaneous claims to the contrary. Anyone who regards the moral treatment as a success is cordially invited to explain the necessity of today's extremely expensive treatment paradigm.

Next comes WWI. The mental health system in Colorado originated via Colorado’s initiative and referendum provisions in 1916. The act passed by a margin of three to one. Although women did not acquire the right to vote in federal elections until 1920, female residents of Colorado possessed the right to vote in Colorado’s elections and referendums when the act was passed. Then-President Woodrow Wilson, who previously deplored the initiative and referendum provisions present in some state governments, became one of the procedure’s staunchest supporters after the passage of the act. The formation of Colorado’s mental health system came just in time for the Selective Service Act, which became effective in 1917.

The advent of prohibition in Colorado suggests that the timing between Colorado’s mental health system and the Selective Service Act of 1917 was not coincidental. Colorado became a dry state on January 1, 1916. At least two historical episodes provide support for the assertion that war efforts and public consumption of alcohol sometimes do not mix well. First is that beer shops were subsequently blamed for encouraging the disturbances in Britain during the 1830s known as the Swing Riots. Second is that alcohol played a large part in the series of disturbances known as the “Draft Riots of 1863” that occurred in New York City. Although prohibition at the federal level wasn’t effective until 1921, by 1916, twenty-three of the forty eight states had statewide prohibition laws. Of the states that did not have statewide prohibition laws, many granted the authority to its individual counties to ban liquor. In 1916, the state of Washington enacted a law which closed breweries and saloons statewide, but which permitted individuals to import liquor for personal use. Although some had advocated prohibition nearly from America’s inception, the nearly universal reason given for what prohibition existed during the years immediately prior to WWI was the desire to prevent Germany from profiting by exporting beer to America. The legitimacy of the reason is suspect since this objective could have been attained either by banning German imports, or by banning the sale of German beer only, or by both. The action taken by the State of Washington flies directly in the face of the nearly universal reason given for prohibition in the years immediately preceding WWI. By permitting individual consumption of alcohol but closing saloons, the State of Washington minimized both dissent against prohibition and the risk of public incitement to the forthcoming draft amongst fellow drinkers. Colorado’s formation of a mental health system contemporaneously with embracing prohibition was thus an impeccably timed one-two punch to a lot of prospective war dissent.

The nature of the mental health profession’s contribution to the WWI effort was demonstrated by newspaper accounts in Lincoln, Nebraska which questioned George Norris’ “mental status.” George Norris was a Representative (1903 – 1913) to the U.S. House and then Senator (1913 – 1943) to the U.S. Senate from the state of Nebraska. He was against the war that was soon forthcoming,26 and was one of extremely few who opposed measures to arm merchant ships of the US.27 The newspapers of his own state vilified him and openly questioned his sanity.28 Norris was obviously very well established and enjoyed considerable political clout. Any of the “little people” against the measure to arm U.S. merchant ships, and especially those who opposed American entry into WWI, and who read the news accounts could not have helped wondering whether their sanity would also be questioned.

One basic problem with labeling dissidents in as mentally ill is that when dissidents without a history of mental illness are suddenly labelled mentally ill contemporaneously with their dissent, it looks a lot like they were so labeled because of their dissent rather than because they are legitimately mentally ill. This “timing problem” was indirectly addressed by Clifford Beers. In 1908, Beers first published his book A Mind That Found Itself in Britain, then later in 1921 in America. Certainly one contribution (and maybe the primary one) of Beers’ book to the objective of promoting war efforts pertained to explaining that it was possible to be mentally ill and be perceived as normal. Beers, after having attempted suicide and been diagnosed as manic depressive, found himself institutionalized. In his book, Beers noted that he graduated from Yale University, and then procured work as a clerk in a life insurance company, where he apparently functioned capably for some eighteen months. To all outward appearances he appeared to be of sound mind, but claims to have been sick even while still at Yale.29 It was at this point that he attempted suicide and was subsequently institutionalized. In his book he mentions that one of his fellow patients opined, “Why you are kept here I cannot understand. Apparently you are as sane as anyone.” Beers admits in his book that this same patient changed his mind after Beers confided in him.30 Later in the book, he details the following conversation with an acquaintance who did not know that Beers was on furlough from an asylum:

During our talk, I so shaped the conversation that the possibility of a recurrence of my mental illness was discussed. The uninformed friend derided the idea. “Then if I were to tell you,” I remarked, “that I am at this moment supposedly insane – at least not normal – and that when I leave here tonight I shall go direct to the very hospital where I was formerly confined, there to remain until the doctors pronounce me fit for freedom, what would you say?’” “I would say that you are a choice sort of liar,” he retorted.31
Beers thus provides three illustrations of how it is possible to be perceived as normal and nonetheless be mentally ill. From Beers’ account of his mental illness, it is easy to infer that war dissidents could similarly have been mentally ill before they started dissenting, and could have maintained the façade of normality throughout the course of their dissent, and still have been legitimately mentally ill.

Photo unavailable

Four very invasive psychiatric treatments were either developed or at least increasingly applied beginning in the late 1930s, just in time for WWII. These were: insulin coma therapy, Metrazol convulsive therapy, lobotomy psychosurgery, and electroconvulsive therapy (ECT). Here is a description of a later refinement of the procedure for a lobotomy:

This new "transorbital" lobotomy involved lifting the upper eyelid and placing the point of a thin surgical instrument (often called an orbitoclast or leucotome, although quite different from the wire loop leucotome described above) under the eyelid and against the top of the eyesocket. A mallet was used to drive the orbitoclast through the thin layer of bone and into the brain along the plane of the bridge of the nose, around fifteen degrees toward the interhemispherical fissure. The orbitoclast was malleted five centimeters (2 in) into the frontal lobes, and then pivoted forty degrees at the orbit perforation so the tip cut toward the opposite side of the head (toward the nose). The instrument was returned to the neutral position and sent a further two centimeters into the brain, before being pivoted around twenty-eight degrees each side, to cut outwards and again inwards. (In a more radical variation at the end of the last cut described, the butt of the orbitoclast was forced upwards so the tool cut vertically down the side of the cortex of the interhemispherical fissure; the "Deep frontal cut".) All cuts were designed to transect the white fibrous matter connecting the cortical tissue of the prefrontal cortex to the thalamus. The leucotome was then withdrawn and the procedure repeated on the other side.32

This procedure is relatively benign compared to that which was deployed before 1945. The previous procedure involved drilling holes through the skull. This previous procedure was used in the U. S. during WWII, but only 684 times. The threat was nonetheless there. Currently, people who are in an insulin coma are transported to an emergency room. Common to both Metrazol convulsive therapy and ECT is the inducing of grand mal seizures, a supposed side effect of which is that the subject becomes extremely susceptible to suggestion. (The word “supposed” is used because it is far from clear that susceptibility to suggestion is not an object of the treatment.) ECT was first administered to a human in 1938 in Rome. At least somewhat interesting is that one of the main pioneers of ECT – Ugo Cerletti - also innovated white coveralls as camouflage for Italian troops fighting in the snow and a delayed time fuse for rifles for military purposes.33 ECT achieved widespread popularity in the U. S. in the 1940s, and remained popular throughout the 1960s. There is no question that it has a negative image with the general populace. This negative perception is sometimes attributed to the movie One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest. There are those in the profession who feel this image is overly harsh. Perhaps there are pretty grand mal seizures?

It is important to note that of the four procedures innovated in the 1930s, only ECT is still used, and then not very often. It has been noted that the timing of these procedures coincides with the imminence of WWII. There is no question that all of them are regarded, whether justly or no, as inhumane. There can be no question that if a war dissenter regarded one of the treatments as a possible consequence of his dissent he would have been less inclined to dissent. When these facts are considered together, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the four innovations of the 1930s were innovated for the purpose of stifling dissent to a war that a whole lot of people knew was coming.

Currently, it is at least interesting to note the proliferation of mental disorder labels in the DSM-V. Among other disorders, the DSM-V lists those who have recently quit smoking cigarettes as having a disorder. Indeed, the DSM-V has been criticized as “medicalizing normality.”34 One looking at the DSM-V from a standpoint of historical American war efforts is immediately struck by the probable inability to raise an army the size of the U.S.’s during the world wars due to the fact that so many would be excused due to being mentally ill. Concomitant with the shrinkage of normal is a difference in the way the U. S. wages war. There is no draft. We now battle on a much smaller scale. While troops have not been completely replaced, missiles accomplish a lot of what it took a pilot, navigator, bombardier, and several gunners to do. Drones replace even more combatants. What a coincidence!

The foregoing has established that there is connection between war and the psychiatric profession in America, and that this connection exists primarily to discourage any resistance to a national war effort. Given the origin and history of the profession in America with regard to war, it should come as no surprise that American psychiatry has intruded into the political arena in areas other than war as well.


Photo unavailable

The attitude of the psychiatric profession toward race relations in America has been and is paradoxical. As noted above, there were those amongst the profession that felt that fighting and risking death for the noble cause of abolishing slavery was mentally healthy. As noted above, there was also at least one who labeled a slave's desire to run away as a mental illness. Racial prejudice is the official reason that explains why so few black Americans were in the military in the two world wars. Not long after the two world wars, Karl Menninger, a (and maybe “the”) preeminent psychiatrist in America opined that racial prejudice was a form of mental illness.35 If the politically correct explanation is in fact correct, and if Menninger was also correct, apparently a significant number of our combatants in the two world wars were mentally ill, even though they were not classified as such. It is interesting to note that Karl Menninger’s brother was Brigadier General William C. Menninger, the Director of the Psychiatry Consultants Division in the office of the Surgeon General of the United States Army during WWII. Certainly no white man was excused from service due to his being racially prejudiced. With the modern trend (if indeed it is a trend) to “make conversation” between psychiatry and Christianity comes another paradox. There can be no question that the New Testament condones slavery. Indeed, in Colossians 3:23, Paul admonishes the Colossian slaves to “obey your masters.” In antebellum America, a person was required to be black before he could be owned as a slave. The Supreme Court of the United States still views part of its job as eradicating the “badges and incidents of slavery.”36 The question thus arises as to how psychiatry can ever tolerate Christianity and at the same time label racial prejudice as mental illness.


In 1973, according to the DSM-II, homosexuality was a mental illness. That year, it was removed from the DSM, purportedly due to the weight of empirical data, changing social norms and a politically active gay community. There were many within the psychiatric profession who objected, but the result of a vote in 1974 by the American Psychiatric Association’s membership upheld the removal. Mere homosexuality was no longer a mental illness. Assuming that the reasons for removal are accurate, it is difficult to see how a classification or non-classification could possibly be more political. Perhaps in the near future we will see anti-gay prejudice as a mental disorder.


The phenomenon once known as crib death has been around for a long time. The Christian Bible contains an account sometimes referred to as “The Wisdom of Solomon.” The account is found at I Kings 3:16 - 27. The account’s relationship to crib death does not require an explanation. The Old Testament also contains an account of how Abraham – the first patriarch – was ready to and nearly did offer the life of his son Isaac as a sacrifice to his god. It also contains the story of Job, who apparently regarded himself as blessed with the birth of his second set of children after the death of his first set. In short, the attitude of the Judeo-Christian religion to children is not entirely benign. It can also be inferred that the phenomenon of non-punishment for crib death has also been around for a long time.

Crib death was responsible for the invention of device called the Arcuccio apparatus. The Arcuccio apparatus was designed to prevent a baby from being smothered, and its nearly universal use in Florence, Italy during the early 1700s to the late 1800s resulted in the nearly universal elimination of infant death by suffocation. The existence and results of the Arcuccio apparatus was noted in an entry in the British Medical Journal way back in 1895. 37 No mention was made of any deaths with the same pathology of smothering but caused by other unknown means.

This paragraph presents an extremely brief sketch of the history of the evolution of crib death into SIDS. In 1962, the Mark Addison Roe Foundation, a research organization to study crib death, was formed.38 In September of 1963, an international conference on sudden infant death was held in Seattle to discuss what was then known about crib death. A grand total of eight experts – five from the U. S. and three from England – as well as thirty other pathologists, pediatricians, and health-care professionals attended the conference. Reportedly, it was decided that more about crib death was unknown than was known. 39 Notwithstanding this void in its knowledge, the group established as one of its goals to establish crib death as a legitimate medical entity.40 Seattle was the site of another such conference in 1969. At this conference, the first definition of SIDS was formulated: “The sudden death of any infant or young child, which is unexpected by history, and in which a thorough postmortem examination fails to demonstrate an adequate cause of death.” 41 At the end of the conference, it was stated that “we can say that [SIDS] is a definable disease” and that “[i]t can no longer be called a mystery killer.” 42

Of those that attended the 1969 conference in Seattle, two persons are particularly noteworthy. One is Dr. Marie Valses-Dapena. One of her roles at the conference was to summarize the development of some half-dozen hypotheses postulated to explain the cause of SIDS. At that point in time, the medical consensus was that there was no genetic predisposition toward SIDS. The case of the children of Marie Noe, aka Martha Moore, was brought up, a case with which Valdes-Dapena professed to be familiar. The pseudonymous Ms. Moore had by 1969 lost a total of ten children. Valdes-Dapena informed those in attendance that the Philadelphia police had finally concluded that the children did not die as the result of SIDS. She added that the results of the investigation could not be reported due to legal ramifications. (They have been reported since, and all one really has to do to understand the authorities’ attitude toward infanticide is to familiarize oneself with the facts of her case, including the sentence for her conviction.) The other particularly noteworthy person in attendance was Dr. Alfred Steinschneider. His future work concerning the deaths of two of the five children of Waneta Hoyt was to serve as the basis for the obviously absurd notion that SIDS ran in the family.

It should be noted that not all within the profession regarded the possibility that SIDS deaths were caused by the mother smothering her infant as “unthinkable.” Among those who thought otherwise was Stuart Asch, who was a psychiatrist and Assistant Clinical Professor at the Mount Sinai Medical Center in New York. Asch however, “didn’t want to prosecute mothers who killed their children during a postpartum psychosis, or, for that matter, during any other kind of infanticidal episode with psychiatric roots.”43 Thus, even among those who were willing to consider the “unthinkable” was an unwillingness to hold the mother accountable. This reluctance is difficult to understand since any helplessness of the victim is properly considered an aggravating factor when punishment is imposed. Given this reluctance, it is certainly possible to view the medical professions denial of the “unthinkable” as reluctance to punish for smothering. How is this not playing God? Perhaps the smothering mothers shouldn’t be the only ones punished.

As of 1971, an estimated 10,000 apparently well infants died suddenly each year.44 It is absolutely crucial to note at the outset that from a pathologist’s point of view, a SIDS death is indistinguishable from a homicide. 45 The pathology of a SIDS baby is the same as that of a baby that was smothered to death. Some babies die in circumstances under which all causes of death other than smothering can be eliminated. Smothering is eliminated by the acceptance of the caregiver’s (usually the mother’s) denial that the infant was smothered. Ergo, the baby succumbed to some mysterious malady, the nature of which remains unknown.

The psychiatric profession and the medical profession have invested much to validate the existence of such a malady. Two of their efforts are particularly noteworthy. The first is that shortly after the push to validate SIDS as a real malady began, there was a shift away from the Freudian theory of child development to the social learning theory and the cognitive development theory of child development. Both of the latter two theories de-emphasize a fundamental concept of Freudian theory - namely, the Electra conflict. The second noteworthy effort was the attribution of the cause of at least some SIDS deaths to apnea. This attribution was primarily due to the work of Alfred Steinschneider, who attributed SIDS to apnea that was allegedly genetic. Accordingly, Steinschneider reached the paradoxical conclusion that SIDS ran in families.

The Freudian theory of child development ruled the psychiatric profession until 1966. One aspect of this theory pertains to how children acquire the standards of sexual behavior expected by society. With regard to the female gender, a fundamental component of this aspect is the existence of the Electra conflict experienced by young girls during the phallic phase of their development. According to Freud, it is during the phallic phase that the girl becomes aware of the fact that she has no penis, and accordingly regards herself as anatomically inferior. Again according to Freud, the girl blames her mother for her lack of a penis, and the object of her unconscious sexual feelings becomes her father. 46 Two other theories were promulgated in 1966 to compete with the Freudian model. One is the social learning theory. Under this theory, the child most readily emulates the parent to which he is most similar, and, mostly by observation, learns to adopt the behavior and attitudes of its same-sexed parent. The social learning theory omits any mention of the Electra conflict.47 The other theory promulgated in 1966 is the cognitive development theory. Under this theory, the first step in the process of sex-role development is for the child to come to a stable realization of her own gender. This theory holds that children do not develop this realization until approximately age seven.48 Implicit in this theory is the de-emphasis of Electra. Since the stable realization does not occur until age seven, it cannot have occurred as a result of the young girl blaming her mother for her lack of a penis.

The following generalization is easily made regarding the three theories. If Freud is correct, then the discovery by young girls that they have no penis is traumatic. If either the social learning theory or the cognitive development theory is correct, then young girls are not traumatized by their discovery that they have no penis.

If it is assumed for the sake of argument that Freud was correct, then Electra is clearly relevant to infanticide. To ease the trauma occasioned by the fact that she has no penis, a young girl is often told that while boys have a penis and girls don’t, girls will grow breasts and can have babies and boys can’t. If the girl is as traumatized by her lack of a penis as Freud held, then the mere fact that she is capable of something that the male is not becomes a motive to give birth. A woman who conceives a child primarily because she can and men can’t necessarily views herself in some sort of competition with men, a class to which the father belongs. For some women, the competition is not won with a successful birth. The father seldom if ever acquires a sense of inferiority occasioned by his inability to give birth, and the esteem in which he holds his child may stir a sense of jealousy. 49 The woman may resent the fact that rather than being devastated by the mother’s ability to do something he couldn’t, the father is instead elated. The woman is thus robbed of the triumph she had anticipated since first being consoled upon her discovery that she lacked a penis. Only the emotional devastation of the father will permit her to recapture her triumph. One way to accomplish this is to kill the child. Until relatively recently, this motive was almost never posited, even though authorities gradually became more willing to accept the fact that "some" SIDS cases were instead murders. Instead, it was psychiatry to the rescue with motives such as "Munchausen-by-proxy" and "postpartum depression." Indeed, the spite motive has been avoided even in cases where the mother clearly battered her child to death after having dated a minority male to spite the racially prejudiced father. Moreover, cases of this type are often filed as "Neglect of a Dependent" rather than "Murder" to obviate the necessity of positing the motive described here.50

Photo unavailable

Thus, by abrogating the Freudian theory of child development, the psychiatric profession removed the existence of a motive for the mother to kill her infant. If this motive is considered removed, then there often may be no other motive to explain why a mother would kill her infant. Accordingly, it would become easier to believe that there exists some unknown malady responsible for a death that precisely resembles death by smothering. (O' course, that could not have been the object of the exercise. Matter of fact, the shrinks have invented two new “motives” postpartum depression and Munchausen-by-proxy to account for those instances where the conclusion that the mother killed her infant is unavoidable.)

It is interesting to note one artist's version of Theraveda Buddhist hell. His painting may be viewed in many temples throughout the country of Cambodia. A special corner in it is reserved for those mothers who kill their baby. Note the wormlike parasites on her breasts. Perhaps young Cambodian girls are consoled upon the discovery that they lack a penis by the promise that they can grow breasts and have babies, too.

Then came the work of Alfred Steinschneider. Steinschneider was a MD with a degree in psychology and a course in statistics. His efforts are described in a book entitled The Death of Innocents. The fruit of his work was an article published in the October 1972 issue of Pediatrics. In it,Steinschneider concluded that sleep apnea was one cause of SIDS. Incredibly, this conclusion was based upon the clinical study of five infants, three of whom did not die. Even more incredibly, the medical profession blindly accepted the conclusion as valid even though the publication that propounded it specified that it was based on the observations of only five patients, three of which did not die. The subsequent confession and conviction of the mother for smothering the two infants that did die obviously completely invalidates Steinschneider’s conclusions. Furthermore, nobody who reads Death of Innocents can escape the conclusion that Steinschneider attempted to manufacture a cause of SIDS.51

To summarize, we have a reluctance on the part of the psychiatric profession to see any mother prosecuted for an infanticidal episode with psychiatric roots, a decision to legitimize crib death as medical malady before much of anything is purportedly known about it, the failure to consider the import of a known method for eliminating infant deaths by suffocation, a shift in childhood development theory that eliminates a motive for a mother to kill her baby, the attempted manufacture of a medical cause for SIDS, and a blind acceptance based upon clearly insufficient data even had Steinschneider’s efforts been honest. Additionally, it can be inferred from fifty plus years of failure to isolate a cause for SIDS that the so-called malady does not exist, yet the medical profession still persists in recognizing SIDS as a malady. Furthermore, while the medical profession has isolated risk factors for SIDS, it feigns oblivion to the obvious fact that mothers willing to eliminate the risk factors are less likely to intentionally smother their child in the first instance. In short, it is difficult not to infer that the medical profession (as well as the psychiatric profession and the legal profession) has deliberately stuck its head in the sand. The question must thus be asked, “Why?”

On January 17, 1962, Federal Executive Order 10988 made it apparent that unless the supply of employees was increased, wages were going to rise substantially. Since they comprise over fifty percent of the population, members of the female gender were the obvious choices to increase the supply. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was already envisioned. Under Title VII, recalcitrant employers (perhaps fearing a backlash from their male employees) can refrain from hiring females only if legitimate reasons for doing so exist. One potentially legitimate reason is the relative physical inferiority of the female gender. The legitimacy of this reason depends entirely on the nature of the work, and it cannot be gainsaid that some women are physically superior to some men. Another potentially legitimate reason is the psychological make-up of the female. The de-emphasis of the Electra conflict removed any potential claim of a non-hire being justifiable under psychological grounds. The murder of infants represents a sacrifice the government was willing to make to increase the effective supply of employees.

It should be noted that although the coroner is typically credited with making the call as to whether an infant death results from smothering or SIDS, the decision whether to prosecute belongs either to the prosecutor or to the grand jury. (Note that in most states, the prosecutor is not required first to present his case to a grand jury, but rather may circumvent it and file a charge directly.) The excuse that the determination of SIDS by the coroner constitutes reasonable doubt is no longer valid, if indeed it ever was. Since fifty-plus years of research has failed to validate the existence of some mysterious malady we now loosely refer to as SIDS, it is ludicrous to regard a determination of SIDS by the coroner as anything other than the absence of a cause of death other than smothering. Prosecutors, are, of course, elected officials, as are coroners. Perhaps the fact that over half the voters in most jurisdictions are female influences the prosecutors’ and the coroners’ decisions.

And now we reach the most disgusting part of the SIDS saga – the old “honest coroner” trick. The writer is aware of two instances where coroners were portrayed as honest by the media where exactly the opposite result should have obtained. The first pertained to the Attica prison riot in 1971. At one point during the riot, the prisoners took non-prisoners hostage. When the authorities conducted a raid, ten of the hostages were killed, all by gunfire. The authorities reported that the hostages were killed by knives wielded by the rioting prisoners. The honest coroner determined that the hostages were killed by gun shots, which meant that either the state troopers or correctional officers inadvertently killed them in the raid. The honest coroner was lauded for his honesty. Nobody asked why the authorities thought the honest coroner would back up their obviously false version in the first place. A similar situation occurred in Lake County, Indiana. On April 6, 1985, James Cooley was found dead in his basement from 32 hammer blows to the head. The Hobart police said it was a suicide. The honest coroner determined it was a homicide. Once again, nobody ever publicly asked why the officers in question ever thought the honest coroner would back them in the first instance. These honest coroners are from the class of people who have formulated the maxim, “One unexplained infant death in a family is SIDS. Two is very suspicious. Three is homicide.” How could any woman considering infanticide for the first time ever be deterred by that?

Waneta Hoyt’s confession, her conviction, and the attendant publicity (including a subsequent book) not only eradicated apnea as a cause of SIDS, it also cast serious doubt as to the legitimacy of SIDS as a medical entity at all. It would be interesting to note how people “in the know” such as judges and lawyers handled cases in the wake of the Hoyt case that before would have been routinely handled as a SIDS case. I’ll wager there are those cases that stick out like a sore thumb during the immediate aftermath of the Hoyt prosecution and the publicity that surrounded it, especially when the publication of The Death of Innocents was imminent.


Without regard to the truth or falsity of Christianity and its dogma, it is easy to see why it is attractive from a political science point of view. Its primary utility is control of the masses. It accomplishes this control with regard to the believer by mandating that he obey the authorities (see Romans 13:1); exalting the meek (see, e.g., Matthew 5:5; Psalm 37:11); exalting the poor (see, e.g., 1 Timothy 6:10; Luke 6:20); and promising a very attractive life after death except for the rich. (see especially Matthew 19:24)

Benjamin Rush (remember - the father of psychiatry in America) at least purported to strongly advocate Christianity. Consider the following three quotes:

The only foundation for … a republic is to be laid in Religion. Without this there can be no virtue, and without virtue there can be no liberty, and liberty is the object and life of all republican governments. 52

I know there is an objection among many people to teaching children doctrines of any kind, because they are liable to be controverted. But let us not be wiser than our Maker. If moral precepts alone could have reformed mankind, the mission of the Son of God into all the world would have been unnecessary. The perfect morality of the Gospel rests upon the doctrine which, though often controverted has never been refuted: I mean the vicarious life and death of the Son of God.”53

I have been alternatively called an Aristocrat and a Democrat. I am neither. I am a Christocrat.54

Rush’s personal bias is apparent from his nomenclature and definition of an attribute of the mind he called the “belief faculty.” In Diseases of the Mind, Rush said, “This [belief] faculty is subject to disorder as well as to disease; that is, to an inability to believe things that are supported by all the evidence that usually enforces belief. Mr. Burke has described the conduct of persons affected with this disorder in the following words: ‘They believe nothing that they do not see, or hear, or measure by a twelve inch rule.’” According to Rush, this disorder extended to “persons who refuse to admit human testimony in favor of the truths of the Christian religion.” 55 Thus, under early nineteenth century psychiatry according to Rush, non-belief in Christianity was a mental disorder. This passage is certainly not the only kind reference to religion. After defining “illusions” as false perceptions of the ears and eyes and listing it as a malady, Rush proceeds to exempt the supernatural voices heard by inter alia, Daniel, Elisha, and Paul. 56 He lists “fear of death” as a disease, and prescribes the formation of “just opinions of the divine government and of the relation we sustain to the great Author of our being,[which]may be best formed by reading the scriptures, and such other books as derive their arguments for fortifying the mind against this fear ….” 57 Rush opined that there was “an innate sense of deity” in the human mind.58 Finally, Rush opined that one who died cursing and denying his God suffered from a total derangement of the moral faculty.59 .

The affinity between Christianity and psychiatry continued at least until the middle years of the nineteenth century. Part and parcel of the moral treatment was religious instruction and regular religious worship. Consider the remarks of Amariah Brigham: "The removal of the insane from home and former associations, with respectful and kind treatment under all circumstances, and in most cases manual labor, attendance on religious worship on Sunday, the establishment of regular habits and of self-control, diversion of the mind from morbid trains of thought, are now generally considered as essential in the Moral Treatment of the Insane"; and "By these remarks we do not however mean to disparage medical treatment as it is in some cases very essential, but we mean to insist upon what we believe to be the fact, that moral treatment including religious instruction and medical advice as to the means of preventing re-attacks, is the most important, and as yet too much neglected." 60 Indeed, writers of more relatively recent times have criticized an asylum in Britain that utilized the moral treatment as being a “duplicitous exercise in religious internment and social coercion, and a pernicious ideological ploy that substitutes moral rectitude and mind control for physical manacles and confinement.” 61

The case of Elizabeth Packard noted above obviously had religious connotations. Recall that the basis of her monomania involved her non-Calvinist views. Less obvious, however, was that the considerably relaxed due process requirements for a husband to commit his wife had Biblical support – Colossians 3:18, Ephesians 5:22, and Titus 2:5 all contain admonitions for wives to be subject to their husbands. The publicity attending her commitment and her crusade to eliminate monomania as a mental illness no doubt had some effect on the psychiatric profession’s treatment of religion. The second half of the 19th century also saw the substantial decline of the moral treatment – by then widely regarded as a failure – and its replacement by other treatment paradigms.62 The three most prominent ones were mesmerism, phrenology, and rest cure. Mesmerism is synonymous with hypnotism. The key components of phrenology were the beliefs that various areas of the brain housed various mental faculties, and that the size of the areas was proportional to the strength of the trait that was housed there. Accordingly, the skull was measured to ascertain whether the size of an area was somehow abnormal. The rest cure involved more than merely “taking a break.” One typically spent six to eight weeks upright only when fed and reclined for much of the remainder. Isolation from family was the norm, and other activities such as reading were often banned. None of these three treatment paradigms had any significant relation to religion. Indeed, Ellen White wrote: “The sciences of phrenology, psychology, and mesmerism are the channel through which he [Satan] comes more directly to this generation and works with that power which is to characterize his efforts near the close of probation.” 63

The rift between Christianity and psychiatry widened with the rise to prominence of Sigmund Freud. Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices (1907) notes the likeness between faith (religious belief) and neurotic obsession.64 According to Freud, God was a father figure for whom humans had ambivalent feelings. There was a desire to kill him, which resulted in guilt, which had to be expiated. “Christianity was therefore a collective neurosis based on suppression and the renunciation of natural instinctive impulses.” 65

It is certainly possible to explain the shift away from Christianity by political expediency. The beginning of the move away from the moral treatment (part and parcel of which was Christianity) coincided with the imminence of the Civil War. Not only would the relative comfort of the moral treatment have eroded deterrent value, it would also have been difficult to explain why a dissenter should follow Biblical precepts but nonetheless fight to free the slaves when one Biblical precept is that slaves should obey their masters. (See Colossians 3:23) The widening of the rift occasioned by the rise to prominence of Freud coincided with the imminence of WWI. There are many who feel that Zionism was at least one cause of the World Wars. 66 Most interestingly, in a footnote of his 1909 work, Analysis of a Phobia in a Five year old Boy, Freud theorized that the universal fear of castration was provoked in the uncircumcised when they perceived circumcision and that this was "the deepest unconscious root of anti-Semitism." 67 It is not difficult to view this hypothesis is another of an historically long line of pretexts for anti-Jewry. In fact, it may be difficult not to so view it.

The rift between Christianity and psychiatry seems to have lessened of late. In 1973, Karl Menninger, one of the most preeminent psychiatrists in America, wrote a book entitled Whatever Happened to Sin?. Menninger’s book is styled as a “long letter to the clergy” 68 that validates the Jewish prophets 69, acknowledges Christ as “our Lord”70 , mentions Benjamin Rush approvingly 71 – and specifically states that “mental health includes … all the healths: physical, social, cultural, and moral (spiritual)72 (Emphasis added.) Others have followed suit. Waneta Hoyt, after having smothered her first child, was advised by her shrink to participate in religious activities. 73 Dan Blazer, another prominent psychiatrist, penned a book in which he stated he wanted to “make conversation between Christianity and psychiatry.” 74 If indeed we are seeing a trend in psychiatry toward Christianity, the following three observations are appropriate. First is that relatively few psychiatrists are even qualified to peddle Christianity, since they are unfamiliar with its history and mostly unfamiliar with its doctrinal underpinnings. Second is that it would be interesting to find out exactly how the shrinks explain away the contradiction presented by the basic underlying assumption of capitalism - that humans act to maximize their own self-interest - with a basic precept of Christianity - the love of money is the root of all evil. (See I Timothy 6:10; see especially Acts 4:32-5:11.) Third is that it would be extremely interesting indeed to compare the quantum of admissible evidence to support the validity of Christianity with the quantum of admissible evidence that exists to support the truth of what psychiatry terms a non-bizarre delusion.


As noted early on, William Verplanck stated that “[t]he history of psychology is largely constituted of a succession of fads overlying the continuity given by a few technological methods which have been progressively misapplied with little critical concern for their social, political, or scientific consequences.“ However, another note psychiatrist has written, “From prisons and punishment and crimes it was a short step to the more general topic of how we control disapproved behavior, our own and that of others.”75 This seems to the writer to clearly indicate a concern on the part of the profession for the political consequences of what seemingly has been a series of fads. The primary diagnosis utilized by the psychiatric profession to accomplish its social, political, and scientific objectives are “delusional disorder- persecutory type.

A delusional disorder is primarily characterized by persistent delusions. According to the DSM-V, a delusion is a false belief that cannot be explained by the patient’s culture of education; the patient cannot be persuaded that the belief is incorrect, despite evidence to the contrary or the weight of opinion of other people.76 Other psychiatric definitions of delusion exist. One is a belief that is “totally incredible to others, unshared, unshakeable, preoccupying, personally referent (rather than religious, scientific or political), distressing or interfering with functioning, unresisted (in contrast with an obsession).” 77 Under this definition, Holocaust Denial is not a delusion. That difficulty inheres in defining delusion is widely acknowledged. 78 The delusion need not be bizarre – it can be a theoretical possibility, maybe even a statistical probability. There are even those who hold that true beliefs can be delusional if they are arrived at incorrectly.79 A delusional belief may also be formed from drawing the wrong inference from a given set of facts. There is no consensus as to how many delusional beliefs are required to support a diagnosis of delusional disorder, or how many are required to mandate a diagnosis of delusional disorder. 80

Two interesting facts to note about the delusional disorder are that: 1) those who suffer with a non-bizarre one typically will not suffer much intellectual and work-related deterioration;81 and 2) that it disproportionately afflicts members of the lower socio-economic class. 82 One reason that the first fact is interesting is because one would normally expect that relative normalcy in all other aspects of a person’s life would be regarded as evidence of sound mental health, and thus tend to bolster either the truth of the so-called delusional belief or at least its reasonableness (non-bizarreness?) though incorrect. I guess not. Another reason that the first fact is interesting is that it permits the appearance of normalcy as well as the dignosis of disorder, thus circumventing any timing problems of the type noted suprawith Clifford DeBeers. The reason that the second is so interesting is that the lower classes have the most reason to be discontent and thus the most reason to question how the status quo came to exist. There is at least one historical parallel to this concept. During both the Dark and Middle Ages, many were put to death with the imprimatur of both the Catholic Church and various governments due to the allegation that they were witches. A grossly disproportionate number of those executed were women. A perfectly reasonable explanation of the reason for the disproportionate number of women executed is that they had the most motivation to question the legitimacy of Christianity. This motivation arises from their compelled subjugation to their husbands being ordained by the Biblical precepts contained in Colossians 3:18, Ephesians 5:22, and Titus 2:5. Nobody has ever publicly proffered this explanation – to do so is tantamount to an accusation that the Church as well as governments that embraced Christianity murdered to perpetuate its existence. Psychiatry, ever the entity to overlook the obvious for the sake of political expediency, has come to the rescue with the notion of “mass hysteria.” Really, what is more delusional than the belief that somebody is a witch?

The reader by now will have noted that most shrinks require that the delusional belief be false. This requirement seems to take into account the notion that “you’re only paranoid if they’re not really following you.” However, the requirement that the delusional belief be false is inadequate to ensure that sane people will not be incorrectly diagnosed as paranoid delusional. The reason that the requirement is inadequate is that members of the psychiatric profession do not expend the effort necessary to ascertain whether the purported delusional belief is in fact true. Indeed, the prevailing psychological approach avoids “doing battle” with the belief diagnosed as delusional. Thus, the requirement is effectively ignored, even though the profession admits that the possibility of misdiagnosis exists. The allegation here is that the requirement is intentionally ignored to permit the psychiatric profession to deliberately diagnose sane people as delusional for the purpose of political expediency.

The media case of Martha Mitchell is most illuminating. Martha Mitchell was the wife of John Mitchell, who was the Attorney General under Richard Nixon. She was divorced in 1973. After her husband’s role in the Watergate scandal became known, she began contacting various members of the press with regard to her ex-husbands role in the scandal. She was publicly labeled mentally ill, but the Watergate investigation vindicated her. She died in May of 1976 from multiple myeloma. As was previously noted, seemingly improbable reports are sometimes erroneously assumed to be symptoms of mental illness. Brendan Maher, a psychologist and long-time professor of psychology at Harvard University, coined the phrase “the Martha Mitchell effect” to describe this situation, and the phrase stuck.

The last thing some poor dumb guy who has been misdiagnosed as paranoid delusional should do is cite the plight of Martha Mitchell to support his sanity. There are at least several reasons. First is that Mitchell’s allegations were criticism of the government, and, as such, were unquestionably protected by the First Amendment. That should be the first line of defense – it would seem that the First Amendment is seldom, if ever, interposed as a defense to alleged mental illness, even when the diagnosis is based upon clearly protected subject matter. In the second place, it is far from clear that any psychiatrists even used Mitchell’s allegations as a basis for a diagnosis. Even if they did, they couldn’t say so - all of them would have been bound by confidentiality requirements. Any allegation that her diagnosis was based upon her Watergate allegations are thus necessarily hearsay, and probably mere conjecture. In the third place, even had Mitchell’s statements not been protected by the First Amendment, the responsibility for determining that the statements were indeed false should have rested with the shrinks. If shrinks are going to put a label like paranoid delusional on somebody, they should be required to be pretty darn sure. Fourthly, assuming everything was as it appeared, Mitchell might well have been paranoid delusional, having once said publicly that nobody since Christ had been persecuted like her. The final reason that Mitchell’s plight should not be cited to refute a diagnosis of mental illness is that one gives up considerably more than one gets by so doing.

Certainly the manner in which the definition of delusion has been applied has led to some interesting results. Everybody knows the ramifications when a psychiatrist hears the word “conspiracy.” It is a sad fact that the word “conspiratorialist” has become synonymous with “whack job.” Conspiracies seem always to be regarded as inherently unlikely, and there is sometimes a paucity of evidence to prove one exists. Consider the following three things. First, if the conspiracy is a good one – i.e., the conspirators are at least reasonably clever – there will not be much evidence to prove the existence of one. It is, however, worth noting that a profit motive typically does exist, and that motive is properly regarded as evidence. Secondly, no less a figure than Adam Smith (remember An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations?) asserted that "We rarely hear, it has been said, of the combinations of masters; though frequently of those of workmen. But whoever imagines, upon this account, that masters rarely combine, is as ignorant of the world as of the subject."83 Moreover, Richard Posner, longtime Judge for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, penned a book on anti-trust law which is replete with references to a concept he called “tacit collusion.”84 Thus it is certainly possible for a conspiracy to exist even without an actual agreement, let alone evidence of an actual agreement.

The universal disregard of this possibility by the psychiatric profession had produced at least one anomaly. It is politically correct and widely accepted that the mafia conspired to kill JFK. Now that is one conspiracy that is inherently unlikely. The question must be asked, “Where is the evidence?” If the question is answered by revealing some evidence, the question then arises, “Why wasn’t anybody prosecuted under this evidence?” To say that the mafia was responsible for the assassination is one thing – to say that they subsequently controlled the FBI, the Warren Commission, and every prosecutor in every county (or parish) that had jurisdiction over the assassination is quite another, and do note that RFK was the Attorney General at the time. The latter situation is tantamount to asserting that the mafia in effect controlled the country. No mean feat for a bunch of semi-literate guys who often operated out of pizza parlors! (Hey, Georgie, fifty years ago that might have been a built-in, huh.) And then, to top it all off, the assassination of RFK would necessarily have to be coincidental, unless of course, Sirhan Sirhan was working for the mafia. Hooey!!!85

Consider a commitment proceeding for somebody who is allegedly suffering from a delusional order – persecutory type. What you have here is a typically secret proceeding (must protect the patient’s privacy, you know) to determine whether an admittedly vague definition that clearly disproportionately afflicts those who are most likely to question how the status quo came to exist applies to somebody who is normal in all other respects. The decision is made not by a jury of one’s peers (must protect the patient’s privacy, you know), but rather by somebody who is a bastion of support for the status quo (i.e., a judge) based on the opinion of a member of a profession that has always been primarily concerned with the control of undesirable political behavior. Might as well be a witch hunt, and each and every one of your legislators knows it!


There is a concept of relatively recent origin known as “junk science.” Junk science is a scientific analysis which is not based upon reliable principles and methods.86 The term often arises in the context of a legal proceeding. Three Supreme Court of the United States cases known as the Daubert trilogy have set the applicable standards for determining whether a scientific analysis constitutes junk science. Somewhat scarily, the Daubert court assigned the determination to the trial judge, apparently feeling that the average juror is not up to the task. (I’ll wager that few if any junk scientists are prosecuted for perjury.) More than merely interestingly, there are those within the legal profession who have raised the question of whether psychiatry is a junk science.

It should be noted at the outset that the psychiatric profession makes an awful lot of money due to the legal profession. Psychiatrists and psychologists are often called as expert witnesses in legal proceedings, and frequently a court compels a person to seek psychiatric help. There are a myriad of legal contexts in which shrinks become involved, e.g.: evaluations of criminal defendants to determine competency to stand trial or whether a defendant was legally insane at the time the offense was committed; evaluation of a defendant who has been convicted of a violent crime to assess the likelihood that he will commit violent crimes in the future 87 ; any proceeding where a party’s mental condition is in controversy 88, or even might be in controversy 89; an involuntary civil commitment hearing; court ordered mediation in a divorce case (the mediator might or might not be a counsellor)90 evaluations of children in need of services; court ordered drug and alcohol rehabilitation; and court ordered anger management. To get an idea of the actual amounts involved here, consider the case of State of Indiana v. Castillo, where the trial court judge ordered, inter alia, a psychiatric evaluation of the defendant that cost the better part of $72,000. 91

The relationship between the legal profession and the psychiatric profession is symbiotic. Consider the case of James Grigson, aka Dr. Death. Part of his story has been well documented in the documentary (not the TV series) The Thin Blue Line. Grigson was a psychiatrist who testified in numerous capital murder trials in Texas. Under Texas law, the testimony of a psychiatrist during the death penalty phase of the trial was admissible to prove that the convicted defendant would commit violent crimes if ever he were released from confinement. The probability that the convicted defendant would commit violent crimes in the future was necessary for the jury to impose the death penalty. Grigson invariably testified in over 100 capital cases that the previously convicted defendant was a sociopath and would commit violent crimes in the event that he was ever released from confinement – that’s how he acquired his nickname. He formed his opinion from very brief interviews (or maybe none at all) with the defendant. Grigson, as well as the prosecutors who employed him as a witness, no doubt felt that they were on safe ground, as the odds against convictions for capital murder being overturned in Texas were astronomical. There was therefore very little risk that a convicted capital murderer would ever have a chance to refrain from committing violent crimes thus proving Grigson wrong. In the event that a convicted murderer was not given the death penalty and instead was confined for a term of years, any failure to commit violent crimes after his release could be explained by the exceptionally fine job of rehabilitation by the Texas Department of Corrections. Moreover, any criticism of the brevity of Grigson’s interviews applied with equal force to the interviews given to inductees into the US armed forces during the era of the World Wars, and it was unlikely anyone would be willing to bring that up.

The bubble burst when the death sentence given to Randall Dale Adams was overturned by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1980. The prosecution chose to allow the sentence to remain commuted to life in prison rather than retry the case. Then, in 1988, Adams was granted the right to a new trial by the Texas Court of Appeals. The prosecution declined to retry Adams, and he was freed in 1989. He died in 2010, without ever having committed a violent crime (or any other crime for which he was prosecuted, for that matter). Although nothing much was ever said about the impropriety of the trial court judge crying during the prosecution’s closing argument during the death penalty phase (and that was by far the most egregious violation of due process in Adam’s trial), the documentary did manage to cast Grigson in a very bad light. At least in part because of the documentary, Grigson was ultimately expelled from both the American Psychiatric Association and the Texas Society of Psychiatric Physicians, but apparently was permitted to practice until 2003, when he retired. One important point is that both associations that expelled Grigson took so long to do so. The most important point is that at no time was Grigson ever penalized in any way by the legal system.

The assertion by those within the legal profession that psychiatry is junk science is merely a pretense of antipathy feigned to disguise the symbiotic nature of the two professions. The literature coming from the legal profession critical of the psychiatric profession typically ignores the obvious successes of the psychiatric profession. 92 For example, that the profession has vastly improved the plight of manic-depressives is beyond serious dispute. It is also clear that the profession serves a custodial function in at least a somewhat capable manner. Not only does the current legal anti-psychiatric-profession literature ignore psychiatric profession successes, it omits from mention some of the more epic failures. The story of Dr. Death has been noted. That Waneta Hoyt was diagnosed as having no disorders has also been noted. Melba Mercades, better known as Rose Cheramie, was in a mental institution where she warned of an imminent attempt on JFK’s life shorty before JFK was assassinated. (What a coincidence, huh doc?) Because it ignores both the psychiatric profession’s successes as well as its most dramatic failures, it is difficult to understand this literature as a serious assault on the legitimacy of the psychiatric profession.

It seems clear to the writer that those insiders who bash the psychiatric profession also have ulterior motives. For example, Peter Breggin has written strongly against the use of any psychiatric drugs whatsoever. His advocacy completely ignores the pharmaceutical successes of the field. It would seem that he is pandering to the animosity toward his profession shared by many who have had the misfortune to become involved with it. Anybody who adopts his position finds not only that he cannot have a beer after work on Friday, but also that he is no longer in a position to object to psychiatric intervention with regard to drug users, an endeavor which promises huge financial rewards for the profession. For another example, Francis Allen has written to criticize the DSM-V’s “medicalization of normalcy.” Adopting this position in this manner results in the tacit acceptance of the status quo as well as the tacit agreement with the medicalization of the abnormal, and there is no question that the status quo is sometimes not a good thing (see Triumph of the Will for an example of a normal Nazi) and that abnormal sometimes is a good thing (see Galileo for an example of abnormally teaching that the sun and not the earth was the center of the solar system and the normal Pope Urban VIII who threatened to execute him if Galileo did not recant). For still another example, examine William Verplanck’s statement noted twice earlier that “[t]he history of psychology is largely constituted of a succession of fads overlying the continuity given by a few technological methods which have been progressively misapplied with little critical concern for their social, political, or scientific consequences.” It should be obvious by now that critical concern for political consequences has always been the primary concern of the psychiatric profession, and that Verplanck was either unaware of this, or was conceding the past failures of the psychiatric profession in order to compromise with regard to the political connection with the failures.


1. Formerly at http://web.utk.edu/~wverplan/ , a site that is no longer up.
2. Benjamin Rush, Medical Inquiries and Observations, Upon the Diseases of the Mind, Kimber & Richardson, Philadelphia, 1812, has been posted online at http://deila.dickinson.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/ownwords/id/20236
3. Rush, p. 114.
4. Rush, p. 115.
5. Rush, p. 113.
6. See generally Gerald N. Grob, Mental Institutions in America: Social Policy to 1875, The Free Press, New York, 1973, and Thomas J. Brown, Dorothea Dix: New England Reformer, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1998.
7. Grob, at 168.
8. Grob, at 374-395.
9. Brown, at 143.
10. Brown at 98.
11. Brown at 108.
12. Id.
13. Brown at 117.
14. Id. at 145.
15. Id. at 147.
16. Brown at 117.
17. George M. Fredrickson, The Inner Civil War: Northern Intellectuals and the Crisis of the Union, Harper and Rowe, New York, 1965 at 170.
18. Grob, p. 243 - 47
19. Grob at 188.
20. Brown at 102.
21. J. Sanbourne Bockoven, M.D., Moral Treatment in American Psychiatry, Springer Publishing Company, Inc., New York, 1963, at p. 20–31; Brown at 327.
22. Everett N. Dick, William Miller and the Advent Crisis 1831 – 1844, Andrews University Press, Berrien Springs, Michigan, 1994, p. 125-26
23. Fredrickson, p. 74
24. Grob, p. 162.
25. Bockoven, p. 20–31;
26. John F. Kennedy, Profiles in Courage, Harper and Row, New York, 1964, p. 212.
27. Id. at 214-18.
28. Id. at 219-220.
29. Clifford Whittingham Beers, A Mind That Found Itself, University of Pittsburg Press, 1981, p. 9.
30. Id. at 61-62
31. Id. at p. 188
32. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lobotomy
33. http://www.breggin.com/ECT/TheOriginsECTNEndler1988.pdf
34. Francis Allen, Saving Normal: An Insider's Revolt against Out-of-Control Psychiatric Diagnosis, DSM-5, Big Pharma, and the Medicalization of Ordinary Life, William Morrow, 2013.
35. Walker Winslow, The Menninger Story, Doubleday & Company, New York, 1956, at p. 300
36. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), Hodges v. U. S., 2013 U.S. 1 (1906), Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
37. For a drawing of the device and the actual entry in the journal, click here
38. Richard Firstman & Jamie Talon, The Death of Innocents: A True Story of Murder, Medicine, and High-stakes Science, Bantam Books, 1997, p. 191.
39. Id. at 192.
40. Id. at 193.
41. Id. at 200.
42. Id. at 206.
43. Id. at 255.
44. Alfred Steinschneider, Prolonged Apnea and the Sudden Infant Death Syndrome: Clinical and Laboratory Observations, Pediatrics, October, 1972.
45. Firstman & Talon, p. 22.
46. Candida C. Peterson, A Child Grows Up, Alfred Publishing Co., New York, 1974, p. 45.
47. Id. at 45, 46
48. Id. at 46
49. See, e.g., Firstman & Talon p. 260.
50. Even in Death of Innocents, where the prosecutor did seek convictions for murder, evidence to support the motive given here was ignored. First, Waneta Hoyt had two brothers (p.153-54), and likely discovered at some point that she differred from them. Second, it is clear that she wanted to have babies very badly, even after she killed all five she'd had. (p. 279) Third, she and her husband were experiencing marital difficulties. (p. 431.) Although every woman who conceives must have discovered at some point that she differed from the male of the species, her desire to have more children after she killed the first five is evidence that she was hit hard by Electra, notwithstanding the explanation in the book that she was taught by her mother that having babies was her primary purpose in life (p. 158). Her husband's assertion that he had never thought about other women (p. 432) is obviously false. Maybe by now it will have occurred to the reader that the motive presented here will be present in most cases. One argument against the correctness of the motive asserted here is that way, way, way more often than not, the mother does not smother her infant. Note, however, that not all mothers who have smothered their infant have been apprehended, and further, that not all mothers who thought about smothering their infant actually did so.
51. See especially Firstman & Talon p. 289-301, 317-324.
52. William J. Federer, America’s God and Country, Fame Publishing Company, Coppell, Texas, 1994, p. 543.
53. Id. at 543-44.
54. Id. at p. 544
55. Rush, p. 271-75.
56. Id. at 308.
57. Id. at 326.
58. Id. at 357.
59. Id. at 358.
60. Amariah Brigham,The Moral Treatment of the Insane, American Journal of Insanity, March 1847.
61. With regard to the York Retreat (in England), Foulcalt offers a scathing denunciantion of the Retreat as a "duplicitous exercise in religious internment and social coercion [that] substitutes moral rectitude and mind control for physical manacles and confinement." http://www.sagepub.com/pomerantzcpstudy/articles/Chapter02_Article01.pdf , citing Foucault, 1972: 600-01.
62. Mary Todd Lincoln, widow of Abraham Lincoln, was treated with the moral treatment at Bellevue Place in 1875.
63. Testimonies for the Church ((Mountain View, California: Pacific Press Pub. Assn., 1948), 1:290, cited at http://dialogue.adventist.org/articles/21_1_burt_e.htm
64. Peter Gay, Freud: A Life for Our Time, W.W. Norton & Co., 1995, p. 435.
65. Dan Blazer, Freud v. God: How Christianity Lost Its Soul & Christianity Lost Its Mind, InterVarsity Press, 1998, p. 67.
66. See http:\\notopius.com, section II(C)(3).
67. Avner Falk, Anti-semitism: A History and Psychoanalysis of Contemporary Hatred
68. Karl Menninger, Whatever Became of Sin?, Hawthorn Books, 1974, p. 230
69. Id. at 2.
70. Id.at 30.
71. Id. at 229.
72. Id. at 230.
73. Firstman & Talon, p. 186. The shrink in question also advised that Waneta Hoyt had no mental disorder! Cf. Dr. Death, infra.
74. Blazer, supra.
75. Menninger, p. 223.
76. James Morrison, DSM-5 Made Easy: A Clinician’s Guide to Diagnosis, The Guilford Press, New York, 2014. p. 58.
77. Alice Krakauer, Ph.D., Defining Delusions: Theoretical Issues, 2000, citing Oltmanns, T. F., Approaches to the Definition and Study of Delusions (1988).)
78. The DSM-III-R definition of delusions bears inconsistencies and does not account for the way delusions are detected clinically. It can be traced back to Karl Jaspers who was the first to mention the three criteria of delusions, which are to be found in the textbooks ever since: (1) certainty, (2) incorrigibility, and (3) impossibility or falsity of content. Psychiatrists always felt uncomfortable with the third criterion, and Kurt Schneider pursued the most thorough attempt to dispose of this criterion by his definition of delusional perception. It can be shown that while his definition is wrong, the phenomena he had in mind do, in fact, have some distinctive features. Proceeding from the first two criteria of Jaspers, a new definition is proposed that emphasizes the way certain contents are stated and disregards the issue of right or wrong. Advantages of this definition are discussed and a distinction between delusions (about external reality) and certain actual experiences (happening in the patient's mind) is proposed. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/2225797?dopt=Abstract
79. Id.
80. See http://www.definedelusions.net/index.html . Add Steinschneider comment here.)
81. Morrison, p. 83.
82. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delusion , citing http://www.depression-treatment-help.com/mental-disorders/delusional-disorder.htm. Cite that book scanned, too.)
83. Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, Prometheus Books, 1991, p. 70.
84. Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective, University of Chicago Press, 1976.
85. If ever the reader is in need of a good laugh, read Dan Moldea's account of the Appalachian Conference in The Hoffa Wars. If ever the reader is in need of a still better laugh, read about Johnny Roselli's petition to have his sentence for his role in the Friar's Club card cheating fraud modified. Be advised that J. Edgar Hoover denied that the existance of what we call the mafia until 1961.
86. See, e.g., Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702)
87. See Dr. Death, infra.
88. See, e.g., Indiana Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 35)
89. http://www.nwitimes.com/news/local/lake/castillo-defense-pleads-for-expert-witnesses/article_36903771-b3ad-522c-b87b-4bad07923ee9.html
90. Indiana Code 31-15, 16, 17
91. http://www.nwitimes.com/news/local/lake/castillo-defense-pleads-for-expert-witnesses/article_36903771-b3ad-522c-b87b-4bad07923ee9.html
92. http://www.tbowleslaw.com/newsletter/BOWLES-N-L-VOL-6-NO-3.pdf

Back to main page.